Dva pohlady na Irak

Naozaj som neumrel, zijem, len som mal vela prace.

Toto bude ale za to strasne dlhy prispevok o tom, ako by Irak vyzeral, ak by nerozhodovali politici, ale vylucne military.

Prva cast je ani velmi neupravovany rozhovor (nechcelo sa mi) so Stevom Biddlom, expertom na vojensku strategiu z US Army War College.

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Najlepsou strategiou v Iraku by bolo zaplavit krajinu vojakmi, ak by na to boli prostriedky. Vojaci by zaistili bezpecnost, sektarske eskadry smrti by prisli o podu pod nohami. Druhym krokom by bolo vynutenie dohody o delbe moci medzi siitmi, sunnitmi a Kurdami. Sucastou dohody by bolo uzavretie primeria. Americke jednotky by v krajine nadalej zostali a na dodrziavanie primeria by dozerali.

Kolko vojakov by stacilo?

Pocul som rozne uvahy o pocte az do pol miliona. Podla mna cim viac, tym lepsie. Ak by sme mali moznost nasadit do Iraku pol miliona vojakov, to by bolo skvele. Pravdepodobne by sa tato strategia dala zvladnut aj s 250 tisicmi, 300-tisicmi. No jednoznacne ich nemame dost na to, aby sa takato strategia dala uplatnit. V idealnom svete by bolo vyhodne umiestnit v Iraku 250 az 300 tisic a este lepsie pol miliona.

Celym problemom je, ze ak mame dosiahnut vyjednany mier, klucove frakcie musia medzi sebou dospiet k dohode. A tieto kompromisy su pre jednotlive frakcie velmi riskantne, pretoze sa boja - z dobrych dovodov- ze dohoda sa velmi rychlo moze zmenit na masove nasilie, rozputane ich rivalmi, ak nahodou kompromis nebude vyhovujuci a niekto ziska dojem, ze sa vzdali prilis vela moci. Takze vsetky skupiny sa boja, medzi sektarskymi skupinami je obrovsky strach. Kym sa nepodari zmensit tento strach, dosiahnut primerie dohodou bude velmi zlozite. Najlepsim sposobom, ako bojovat proti tomuto strachu, je umiestnit vojaka na kazdy roh, aby bola vsade jasne viditelna pritomnost neutralnej vojenskej sily. Eskadry smrti tak pridu o slobodu konat, povstalci uz nebudu moct len tak v noci vychadzat a pripravovat bomby popri cestach, snajprov okamzite odhalia a zlikviduju.

Ale potom bude vyssi aj pocet americkych obeti...

Len z velmi kratkodobeho hladiska. Hlavnym pozitivom velmi masivneho vojenskeho nasadenia je to, ze zabijanie Americanov sa stane prilis riskantnym.

Prvy tyzden ano, na uliciach by bolo omnoho viac americkych cielov. Takze povstalci, ktori doteraz ostrelovali, nastrazovali IED, vrazdili a vsetko co robia i teraz, by v tom pokracovali i v prvy tyzden masivnej vojenskej pritomnosti. Lenze polovica z nich by zomrela pri pokuse o to. V skutocnosti by mozno zabili viac Americanov, no ich vlastny pocet obeti by bol taky vysoky, ze ak by pokracovali. velmi rychlo by pochopili, ze sa im to nevyplaca. Niektori z nich su sice samovrazedni atentatnici, no väcsina z nich nie. A ta väcsina by sa musela stiahnut.

Cize masivne vojenske nasadenie by znamenalo velmi kratky narast americkych obeti, no potom dramaticky pokles. Vojaci by totiz boli schopni branit sa sami, dokazali by potlacit nasilie.

Naopak, ak sa pozriete na to, co napriklad odporuca Baker-Hamilton, je mnoho Americanov, ktori chcu ciastocne znizenie poctu americkych vojakov a myslia si, ze to znizi i pocet americkych obeti. Veria, ze pocet obeti je umerny poctu cielov. Menej vojakov znamena menej mŕtvych. Viac vojakov znamena viac tercov, viac obeti. To je chybne uvazovanie. Toto je len mytus. Ak stiahneme cast vojakov, stale v Iraku zostane velky pocet cielov, ale nebudu moct ovladat prostredie. A pretoze bude jednoduchsie pre povstalcov zabijat tych, co zostali, po ciastocnom stiahnuti dosiahneme kratkodobe znizenie poctu obeti, nasledovane dlhodobym narastom.

Optimalna vojenska strategia, ak vynechame domacu politiku a vsetko naokolo, by bolo velmi masivne zvysenie poctu americkych vojakov v oblasti, po ktorom by nasledovala diplomaticka ofenziva, ktora by iracke frakcie dotlacila k primeriu.

Akych vaznych chyb sa doteraz military dopustila?

Ozbrojene sily sa dopustili mnozstva strategickych chyb. Nieco spravili velmi dobre. Spravne odhadli, ze aktivne hliadkovanie je potrebne, odhadli, ze je spravne minimalne pouzitie sily, ak snajper na nas striela, neznicme celu budovu, ale len snajpra, odpovedat cielenymi udermi.

Je vsak vela toho, kde vojaci urobili chyby. Este na zaciatku konfliktu, v roku 2003, US Army pouzivala prilis vela nasilia. Stravili prilis vela casu pri ofenzivnych sweeps. Dufali, ze tak znicia tych zopar bast baasistov. No naopak, podarilo sa im proti sebe postvat sunnitsku cast populacie, ktora  pri tychto utokoch trpela, kedze v ich stvrtiach Americania znicili mnoho domov a o zivot prislo vela civilistov ako vedlajsi efekt zabijania rebelov. V konecnom dosledku tak vytvorili dalsie basty rebelov. Tento pristup v rokoch 2003 a neskor 2004 bol obrovskou strategickou chybou.

No najväcsou strategickou chybou bola myslienka, ze mozeme vybudovat iracke ozbrojene sily a odovzdat vedenie konfliktu im. To je za posledny rok a pol hlavna americka strategia v Iraku. A je to zaroven fundamentalna chyba. Problemom je, ze vojna v Iraku je communal obcianska vojna medzi sunnitmi a siitmi a Kurdami. My si myslime, ze budujeme narodnu iracku instituciu, ktora ochrani vsetkych Iracanov bez ohladu na ich prislusnost pred hŕstkou povstalcov, cudzincov a teroristov. Sunitska populacia to ale vnima tak, ze vytvarame siitsko-kurdske milicie s lepsimi zbranami. Oni novu armadu nevnimaju ako decentralizovanu narodnu instituciu. Myslia si, ze vlada je ovladana ich siitskymi rivalmi a ze nova armada je nastrojom vlady. Tym, ze trenujeme a zbrojime novu armadu, vlastne vyzbrojujeme jednu zo stran v obcianskej vojne, co nuti druhu stranu, aby bojovala este tvrdsie.

Bola ina moznost?

Inou moznostou bolo prave postarat sa dlhodobo o bezpecnost sami alebo spolocne so spojencami az kym by nedoslo k politickemu kompromisu. Ak v krajine budeme mat tolko vojakov, ze dokazu zabezpecit bezpecnost pre obyvatelstvo, povstalci odovzdaju zbrane, dojde k politickej dohode, mozno stiahnut cast vojakov, no zostat v krajine ako peacekeeperi a strazit dodrziavanie dohody. Nakoniec dostaneme situaciu, ktora v mnohom pripomina Bosnu a Kosovo. Pretoze v Bosne je to, co sa snazime dosiahnut v Iraku. Mali sme tam etnicku obciansku vojnu, ktoru sa podarilo zvladnut dohodou o delbe moci, na ktorej dodrziavanie dohliadaju vojaci z inych krajin. A v Bosne to funguje. Jednotlive etnika sa sice nadalej neznasaju, no aspon po sebe nestrielaju. Ak by sa nam podarilo dosiahnut toto, v Iraku by to bolo obrovske zlepsenie.

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Druhu cast zabezpecil AM. Toto su uvahy britskeho plukovnika Guya Sayla, OBE, ktory sa tiez akosi vyzna vo vojenskej strategii :-)

In answer to your queries, I would make the following points:

a. The invasion of Iraq was conducted efficiently, precisely and with the  minimum of casualties. The US Commander, General Tommy Franks, had had  plenty of experience in the Middle East and was the ideal commander for operations in Iraq. Unfortunatey he retired shortly after the invasion.

b. The performanvce of the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) after the invasion and until it was disbanced was inept, ignorant and in many cases corrupt. This included personnel at all levels both military and civilian ,and also many of the private companies, large and small, that were initially involved in the reconstruction process.

c. The performance of the coalition military forces was exemplified,in many cases, by poor commanders, indescriminate use of force, and lack of discipline that went, in many cases, unchecked by national governments.

d. Elements of the Iraqi army and paramilitary forces should have been retained. However this process should have been selective. Large parts of the  regular army were badly equipped, poorly lead, and operationally ineffective. Certain elements of this shoud have been retained where possible in formed units. Such retention should have included elements of the highly trained and well equipped Republican Guard (but not the Special Republican Guard) provided that strict vetting of commanders at all levels was carried out in order to weed out those with proven involvement in the worst excesses of the Saddam regime.

e. The coalition campaign thus far has been exemplified by cases of ill discipline and indeed crimes against accepted international law - examples include the Abu Ghraib prison affair, the current court martial of officers and soldiers from a UK regiment, and continuos examples of indiscriminate killing, breakdown of discipline, excessive violence against civilians and rape. It does not matter whether these cases are few in number although even that is in doubt. It does not matter that the insurgents use barbaric methopds incuding beheading and tortuire. Military forces used in peace support or counter-insurgency operations must use selective force and avoid indescriminate tactics and use of weapons, particularly when operating in populated areas. Commanders at every level must be held responsible for the behaviour of their soldiers - the defence by a commanding officer that he was elsewhere when criminal acts by soldiers were taking place is unacceptable.

f. It is unbelievable that US military forces have not learnt from Viet Nam, Somalia and elsewhere that air power, use of maximum force, and general war tactics cannot alone succeed in an urban counter-insurgency environment. It is difficult, as UK forces have discovered in a number of counter-insurgency operations over the last sixty year including Aden, Malaya, Kenya and Northern Ireland, for combat trained forces to adapt to the more finely tuned tactics and strategy required in counter-insurgency operations but everyone from top to bottom  has to learn this.


What needs to be done ?  Coalition forces need to concentrate on certain key tasks as follows :

a. Protection of the elected government and its key institutions particularkly the education system.

b. Protection of oil productuon and distribution and of ket utilities.

c.Force protection of bases and lines of communication.

d. Carefully planned, inte;gence generated and specifially targetted operations (in many caees carried out by sopecial forces) against high value insurgent targets.

f. Increased training of and operational use of Iraqi forces.

g. Avoidance of allowing the insurgents to gain propaganda victories both in Iraq and elsewhere from killing or injurying coalition forces.

H. improving unit and indivdual discipline.

Separately on the political front, governments must compromise on their own agendas and engage in dialogue with their international opponents. The US must temper their desire to impose what they regard as the only acceptable government system - American style democracy, and must engage with Iran and Syria not just over Iraq but also over other issues sch as Israel, Palestine and Iran's legimate right to nuclear technology. Iran must rein in its surrogates not only in raq but also in the Lebanon and Palestine.

Will this work - prpbably not. Other Arabs will tell you that Iraq is a violent and lawless country - it has a history of this going back a thousand yeas or more - extortion, kdnapping and physical violence is often the norm.
 
Even under Saddam this was reduced but not eradicated. But the international media must also be involved in publicizing the reality that not all parts of Iraq are violent - much of Iraq is peaceful  and showing signs of economic and social recovery. This is not newsworthy and the media must hold some responsibility for generating increased violence by just presenting the violence and by not accepting that it cannot neceessarily be judged by western standards of behaviour

Posted by: skMarine at 13:42 | link | comments (1)
irak